Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20423 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorPissarides, Christopher A.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:14:00Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:14:00Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20423-
dc.description.abstractThis paper derives optimal employment contracts when workers are risk averse and there areemployment and unemployment risks. Without income insurance, consumption rises duringemployment and falls during unemployment. Optimal employment contracts offer severancecompensation and sometimes give notice before dismissal. Severance compensationsmoothes consumption during employment but dismissal delays insure partially against theunemployment risk because of moral hazard. During the delay consumption falls to giveincentives to the worker to search for another job. No dismissal delays are optimal ifexogenous unemployment compensation is sufficiently generous.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1183en
dc.subject.jelE24en
dc.subject.jelJ32en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelE21en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordemployment risken
dc.subject.keywordunemployment risken
dc.subject.keywordseverance compensationen
dc.subject.keywordnotice of dismissalen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsvertragen
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosenversicherungen
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosigkeiten
dc.subject.stwRisikoen
dc.subject.stwKonsumen
dc.subject.stwArbeitskräfteen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarkttheorieen
dc.titleConsumption and Savings with Unemployment Risk : Implications for Optimal Employment Contracts-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn389194298en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
566.57 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.