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|dc.description.abstract||I study data on bribes actually paid by individuals to public officials, viewing the resultsthrough a theoretical lens that considers the implications of trust networks. A bond of trustmay permit an implicit quid pro quo to substitute for a bribe, which reduces corruption.Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, by long-term residents ofareas with many other long-term residents, and by individuals in regions with many residentstheir own age. I confirm that the prevalence of bribery is lower under these circumstances,using the International Crime Victim Surveys. I also find that older people, who have had timeto develop a network, bribe less. These results highlight the uphill nature of the battle againstcorruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility. I show thatvictims of (other) crimes bribe all types of public officials more than non-victims, and arguethat both their victimization and bribery stem from a distrustful environment.||en_US|
|dc.publisher|||aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn||en_US|
|dc.relation.ispartofseries|||aIZA Discussion paper series |x1179||en_US|
|dc.title||Trust and Bribery : The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link with Crime||en_US|
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