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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 1172
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper revisits the normative properties of search-matching economies when homogeneous workers have concave utility functions and wages are bargained over. The optimal allocation of resources is characterized first when information is perfect and second when search effort is not observable. To decentralize these optima, employees should be unable to extract a rent when information is perfect. An appropriate positive rent is however needed in the second case. To implement these optima, non-linear income taxation is a key complement to unemployment insurance. According to the level of the workers? bargaining power, taxation has to be progressive or regressive. These properties are also studied through numerical simulations.
Schlagwörter: 
unemployment
non-linear taxation
unemployment benefits
moral hazard
search
matching
JEL: 
H21
D82
J64
J65
J68
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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