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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20380
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Glazer, Amihai | en |
dc.contributor.author | Gersbach, Hans | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:13:41Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:13:41Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20380 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We consider a firm which pays a worker for his effort over several periods. The more the firmpays in one period, the wealthier the worker is in the following periods, and so the more hemust be paid for a given effort. This wealth effect can induce an employer to pay little initiallyand more later on. For related reasons, the worker may work harder than the employerprefers. The incentive contracts firms offer may therefore cap the worker?s earnings. Lastly,this wealth ratchet effect can induce excessive firing and turnover. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x1143 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J60 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J30 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D80 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | principal-agent | en |
dc.subject.keyword | compensation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | moral hazard | en |
dc.subject.keyword | wealth effects | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Ratchet effects | en |
dc.subject.keyword | high-powered incentives | en |
dc.subject.stw | Vergütungssystem | en |
dc.subject.stw | Anreizvertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungsmotivation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Vermögenseffekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsmobilität | en |
dc.subject.stw | Agency Theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 386980365 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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