Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20380
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dc.contributor.authorGlazer, Amihaien_US
dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:13:41Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:13:41Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20380-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a firm which pays a worker for his effort over several periods. The more the firmpays in one period, the wealthier the worker is in the following periods, and so the more hemust be paid for a given effort. This wealth effect can induce an employer to pay little initiallyand more later on. For related reasons, the worker may work harder than the employerprefers. The incentive contracts firms offer may therefore cap the worker?s earnings. Lastly,this wealth ratchet effect can induce excessive firing and turnover.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x1143en_US
dc.subject.jelJ60en_US
dc.subject.jelJ30en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordprincipal-agenten_US
dc.subject.keywordcompensationen_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordwealth effectsen_US
dc.subject.keywordRatchet effectsen_US
dc.subject.keywordhigh-powered incentivesen_US
dc.subject.stwVergütungssystemen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwVermögenseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmobilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleHigh Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effecten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn386980365en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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