Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20380 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 1143
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a firm which pays a worker for his effort over several periods. The more the firm pays in one period, the wealthier the worker is in the following periods, and so the more he must be paid for a given effort. This wealth effect can induce an employer to pay little initially and more later on. For related reasons, the worker may work harder than the employer prefers. The incentive contracts firms offer may therefore cap the worker?s earnings. Lastly, this wealth ratchet effect can induce excessive firing and turnover.
Schlagwörter: 
principal-agent
compensation
moral hazard
wealth effects
Ratchet effects
high-powered incentives
JEL: 
J60
J30
D80
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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