Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20368
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBurda, Michael C.en_US
dc.contributor.authorBoeri, Titoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:13:36Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:13:36Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20368-
dc.description.abstractFiring frictions and renegotiation costs affect worker and firm preferences for rigid wagesversus individualized Nash bargaining in a standard model of equilibrium unemployment, inwhich workers vary by observable skill. Rigid wages permit savings on renegotiation costsand prevent workers from exploiting the firing friction. For standard calibrations, the modelcan account for political support for wage rigidity by both workers and firms, especially inlabor markets for intermediate skills. The firing friction is necessary for this effect, andreinforces the impact of both turbulence and other labor market institutions on preferences forrigid wages.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x1133en_US
dc.subject.jelD7en_US
dc.subject.jelJ6en_US
dc.subject.jelJ5en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordwage rigiditiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordjob protectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordfiring taxesen_US
dc.subject.keywordrenegotiation costsen_US
dc.subject.keywordequilibrium unemploymenten_US
dc.subject.stwLohnrigiditäten_US
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorie der Arbeitslosigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwKündigungsschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwKostenen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePreferences for Rigid versus Individualized Wage Setting in Search Economies with Frictionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn386737487en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
681.16 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.