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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20368
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Burda, Michael C. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Boeri, Tito | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:13:36Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:13:36Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20368 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Firing frictions and renegotiation costs affect worker and firm preferences for rigid wagesversus individualized Nash bargaining in a standard model of equilibrium unemployment, inwhich workers vary by observable skill. Rigid wages permit savings on renegotiation costsand prevent workers from exploiting the firing friction. For standard calibrations, the modelcan account for political support for wage rigidity by both workers and firms, especially inlabor markets for intermediate skills. The firing friction is necessary for this effect, andreinforces the impact of both turbulence and other labor market institutions on preferences forrigid wages. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x1133 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D7 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J6 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J5 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | wage rigidities | en |
dc.subject.keyword | job protection | en |
dc.subject.keyword | firing taxes | en |
dc.subject.keyword | renegotiation costs | en |
dc.subject.keyword | equilibrium unemployment | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohnrigidität | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohnverhandlungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kündigungsschutz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kosten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhandlungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Preferences for Rigid versus Individualized Wage Setting in Search Economies with Frictions | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 386737487 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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