Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/203651
Authors: 
Pagnozzi, Marco
Piccolo, Salvatore
Reisinger, Markus
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2019: 30 Jahre Mauerfall - Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft - Session: Industrial Organisation IV No. E26-V3
Abstract: 
A manufacturer chooses the optimal retail market structure and bilaterally and secretly contracts with each (homogeneous) retailer. In a classic framework without asymmetric information, the manufacturer sells through a single exclusive retailer in order to eliminate the opportunism problem. When retailers are privately informed about their (common) marginal cost, however, the number of competing retailers also affects their information rents and the manufacturer may prefer an oligopolistic market structure. We characterize how the manufacturer's production technology, the elasticity of final demand, and the size of the market affect the optimal number of retailers. Our results arise both with price and quantity competition, and also when retailers' costs are imperfectly correlated.
Subjects: 
asymmetric information
distribution network
opportunism
retail market structure
vertical contracting
JEL: 
D43
L11
L42
L81
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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