Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/203616
Authors: 
Ott, Marion
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2019: 30 Jahre Mauerfall - Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft - Session: Industrial Organisation - Auctions No. C21-V3
Abstract: 
This paper derives Bayesian equilibria under general conditions for a broad family of sealed-bid combinatorial auction formats under incomplete information. Equilibria are constructed by linking an equilibrium of the combinatorial auction format to an equilibrium of its single-unit version, thereby providing a closed-form expression if the single-unit version has one. Auction formats that share the same single-unit version, like the Vickrey auction and all bidder-optimal core-selecting auctions, have common equilibria for any number of items and bidders. Furthermore, if an ex-post equilibrium exists in the single-unit version of an auction then the auction format has an ex-post equilibrium in the combinatorial auction. We characterize the ex-post equilibria for a subfamily of auctions.
Subjects: 
Combinatorial auction
Bayesian equilibrium
equilibrium existence
ex-post equilibrium
JEL: 
D44
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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