Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/203569
Authors: 
de Haas, Samuel
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2019: 30 Jahre Mauerfall - Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft - Session: Industrial Organisation - Theory No. B13-V1
Abstract: 
Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sustainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes firms' choice of NCMS and answers the question: Would colluding firms find it rational to acquire NCMS in rivals? The study of the acquisition reveals that firms have an incentive to acquire NCMS which are accompanied by a shift from collusive to competitive behaviour.
Subjects: 
Collusion
Coordinated Effects
Minority Shareholdings
Merger Control
Unilateral Effects
JEL: 
G34
K21
L41
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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