Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/203517
Authors: 
Schottmüller, Christoph
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2019: 30 Jahre Mauerfall - Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft - Session: Economic Theory - Incomplete Information Games No. F05-V2
Abstract: 
Why do people appear to forgo information by sorting into 'echo chambers'? We construct a highly tractable multi-sender, multi-receiver cheap talk game in which players choose with whom to communicate. We show that segregation into small, homogeneous groups can improve everybody's information and generate Paretoimprovements. Polarized preferences create a need for segregation; uncertainty about preferences and the availability of public information magnify this need. Using data from Twitter, we show several behavioral patterns that are consistent with the results of our model.
Subjects: 
asymmetric information
echo chambers
polarization
debate
cheap talk
information aggregation
Twitter
JEL: 
D82
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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