Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202982
Authors: 
Eraslan, Hülya
Özertürk, Saltuk
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper 1808
Abstract: 
We develop a model to study the political economy implications of information gatekeeping, i.e., a policy of granting access only to friendly media outlets and denying access to critical ones. While an incumbent prefers positive bias, granting access improves her re-election probability only if coverage is sufficiently credible in the eyes of the public. Information gatekeeping can induce a quid pro quo relationship: media provides coverage with positive bias in exchange of future access, thereby affecting electoral outcomes in favor of incompetent incumbents. The degree of access media enjoy increases with competence of incumbents over those issues under public focus.
Subjects: 
Information gatekeeping
media outlet
electoral competition
access
media bias
JEL: 
D72
D83
L82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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