Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202968
Autoren: 
Ertaç, Seda
Gümren, Mert
Koçkesen, Levent
Datum: 
2017
Reihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper 1714
Zusammenfassung: 
FeedbackWe theoretically and experimentally analyze public and private feedback in teams that are characterized by different performance technologies. We consider a setting where the principal can provide truthful information on agents' performances or strategically withhold feedback. We find that if team performance is determined by the best performer (the "best-shot technology"), then both public and private feedback are better than no feedback unless the team is composed of all low performers, in which case no feedback is best. If, on the other hand, team performance is determined by the worst performer (the weakest-link technology), then no feedback is the best regime unless the team is composed of all high performers, in which case public or private feedback is better. Our results have implications for performance feedback policies in educational settings and the workplace.
Schlagwörter: 
Lab experiments
Feedback
Performance feedback
Teams
Strategic communication
Disclosure games
Multiple audiences
JEL: 
C72
C92
D23
D82
D83
M12
M54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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