Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202934
Authors: 
Wiener, Noe
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper 2018-01
Abstract: 
This paper proposes a measure of the intensity of competition in labor markets on the basis of limited data. Large-scale socioeconomic surveys often lack detailed information on competitive behavior. It is particularly difficult to determine whether a worker moves between the different segments of the labor market. Here, the Maximum Entropy principle is used to make inferences about the unobserved mobility decisions of workers in US household data. A class of models is proposed that reflects a parsimonious conception of competition in the Smithian tradition, as well as being consistent with a range of detailed behavioral models. The Quantal Response Statistical Equilibrium (QRSE) class of models can be seen to give robust microfoundations to the persistent patterns of wage inequality among equivalent workers. Furthermore, the QRSE effectively endogenizes the definition of labor market segments, allowing us to interpret the estimated competition intensities as partial measures of labor market segmentation. Models of this class generate predictions that capture between 97.5 and 99.5 percent of the informational content of the sample wage distributions. In addition to providing a very good fit to the wage data, the predictions are also consistent with bounded rationality of workers.
Subjects: 
Labor market competition
segmented labor markets
job mobility
wage inequality
statistical equilibrium
maximum entropy
JEL: 
C18
J31
J42
J62
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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