Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202851 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 77
Verlag: 
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
When the debt of firms in distress is dispersed, a restructuring agreement is difficult to reach because of free riding. We develop a repeated game in which banks come across each other frequently, allowing them to threaten a punishment in case of free riding. As the number of lending banks grows, the chance of meeting again a bank and of being punished for free riding increases, improving the likelihood of cooperation. Looking at Italian firms in distress, we find that the restructuring probability increases with the number of banks up to a threshold - three banks - beyond which coordination problems prevail.
Schlagwörter: 
banks
debt restructuring
number of creditors
JEL: 
G21
G33
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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