Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202851
Authors: 
Baglioni, Angelo
Colombo, Luca
Rossi, Paola
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper 77
Abstract: 
When the debt of firms in distress is dispersed, a restructuring agreement is difficult to reach because of free riding. We develop a repeated game in which banks come across each other frequently, allowing them to threaten a punishment in case of free riding. As the number of lending banks grows, the chance of meeting again a bank and of being punished for free riding increases, improving the likelihood of cooperation. Looking at Italian firms in distress, we find that the restructuring probability increases with the number of banks up to a threshold - three banks - beyond which coordination problems prevail.
Subjects: 
banks
debt restructuring
number of creditors
JEL: 
G21
G33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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