Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202700 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 12354
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
In this article, we empirically study the survival of the ruling party in parliamentary democracies using a hazard rate model. We define survival of a crisis as being successful in a critical vote in the parliament. We develop a general probabilistic model of political crises and test it empirically. We find that during crises, parties in the parliament are likely to vote independently of each other. Thus, we receive as an empirical result what the previous voting power literature assumed.
Subjects: 
voting power
coalitions
cabinet duration
Shapley-Shubik index
Rae index
JEL: 
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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