Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202664 
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Birmingham Business School Discussion Paper Series No. 2015-03
Publisher: 
University of Birmingham, Birmingham Business School, Birmingham
Abstract: 
We analyze the consequences of a monopolistic, non-partisan, profit-maximizing media on policy divergence. The media undertakes costly coverage that may reveal the quality of an office-seeking political challenger only if quality-conscious voters pay an access fee. Voters are ideologically homogenous and the incumbent politican is a populist with known quality. We show that while media absence implies a populist challenger, media presence yields platform extremism: it creates demand for information about quality and provides incentives to the media to invest in coverage that are exploited by high-quality challengers to signal strength.
JEL: 
C72
D72
D82
URL of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-sa Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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