Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202618 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum No. 10/2017
Publisher: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Abstract: 
We provide comparable algorithms for the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure, iterated admissibility, proper rationalizability and full permissibility by means of the concepts of preference restrictions and likelihood orderings. We apply the algorithms for comparing iterated admissibility, proper rationalizability and full permissibility, and provide a sufficient condition under which iterated admissibility does not rule out properly rationalizable strategies. Finally, we use the algorithms to examine an economically relevant strategic situation, namely a bilateral commitment bargaining game.
Subjects: 
Non-cooperative games
proper rationalizability
iterated admissibility
bargaining
JEL: 
C72
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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