Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20260
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dc.contributor.authorFriebel, Guidoen_US
dc.contributor.authorGuriev, Sergeien_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:12:48Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:12:48Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20260-
dc.description.abstractWe introduce financial constraints in a theoretical analysis of illegal immigration.Intermediaries finance the migration costs of wealth-constrained migrants, who entertemporary servitude contracts to pay back the debt. These debt/labor contracts are moreeasily enforceable in the illegal than in the legal sector of the host country. Hence, whenmoving from the illegal to the legal sector becomes more costly, for instance, because ofstricter deportation policies, fewer immigrants default on debt. This reduces the risks forintermediaries, who are then more willing to finance illegal migration. Stricter deportationpolicies may thus increase rather than decrease the ex ante flow of illegal migrants. We alsoshow that stricter deportation policies worsen the skill composition of immigrants. Whilestricter border controls decrease overall immigration, they may also result in an increase ofdebt-financed migration.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x1025en_US
dc.subject.jelN21en_US
dc.subject.jelJ61en_US
dc.subject.jelO17en_US
dc.subject.jelO15en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordillegal migrationen_US
dc.subject.keywordwealth constraintsen_US
dc.subject.keywordindentured servitudeen_US
dc.subject.keywordfinancial contractingen_US
dc.subject.stwIllegale Einwanderungen_US
dc.subject.stwPrivate Verschuldungen_US
dc.subject.stwVerschuldungsrestriktionen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwMigrationspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleSmuggling Humans: A Theory of Debt-Financed Migrationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn37932931Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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