Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20258 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 1023
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
By the well established tournament literature, incomplete information regarding the employees? productivity is essential for the rationalization of (efficiency-enhancing) tournaments. In this paper we propose an alternative rationalization of tournaments focusing on a fully informed principal whose objective is to maximize a weighted average of the profitability (productivity) of his team and of the promotion-seeking efforts of his employees. Our first main result clarifies the conditions under which the principal has an incentive to create a tournament that determines the promoted employee. We then examine the effect of the employees' productivity on their probability of promotion and on the extent of the resources wasted in the tournament. In particular, we specify the conditions that ensure that the most productive employee (the natural candidate for promotion) is less likely to be promoted and the conditions under which higher employee's productivity results in increased wasted promotion-seeking efforts.
Schlagwörter: 
tournaments
promotion
JEL: 
J2
D71
D2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
344.63 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.