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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20255
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Koskela, Erkki | en |
dc.contributor.author | Stenbacka, Rune | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:12:46Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:12:46Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20255 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibriumunemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenousoutside options increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In ageneral equilibrium with endogenous outside options this relationship is frequently reversed;reduced credit market imperfections increase equilibrium unemployment if the labour marketimperfections – measured by the bargaining power of trade unions - are sufficiently strongand benefit-replacement ratio high enough. Finally, we show that higher bankruptcy risksincrease equilibrium unemployment under similar conditions. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x1020 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G32 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J41 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J51 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | wage and loan bargaining | en |
dc.subject.keyword | compensation systems | en |
dc.subject.keyword | equilibrium unemployment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | outside options | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gleichgewicht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Tarifliche Gewinnbeteiligung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kreditmarkt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Unvollkommener Markt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohnverhandlungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Profit Sharing, Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 378963260 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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