Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20255 
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dc.contributor.authorKoskela, Erkkien
dc.contributor.authorStenbacka, Runeen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:12:46Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:12:46Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20255-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibriumunemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenousoutside options increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In ageneral equilibrium with endogenous outside options this relationship is frequently reversed;reduced credit market imperfections increase equilibrium unemployment if the labour marketimperfections – measured by the bargaining power of trade unions - are sufficiently strongand benefit-replacement ratio high enough. Finally, we show that higher bankruptcy risksincrease equilibrium unemployment under similar conditions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1020en
dc.subject.jelG32en
dc.subject.jelJ41en
dc.subject.jelJ51en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordwage and loan bargainingen
dc.subject.keywordcompensation systemsen
dc.subject.keywordequilibrium unemploymenten
dc.subject.keywordoutside optionsen
dc.subject.stwTheorie der Arbeitslosigkeiten
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwTarifliche Gewinnbeteiligungen
dc.subject.stwKreditmarkten
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommener Markten
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleProfit Sharing, Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn378963260en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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