Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202542
Autor:innen: 
Milchtaich, Igal
Datum: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2017-07
Verlag: 
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics, Ramat-Gan
Zusammenfassung: 
Static stability in strategic games differs from dynamic stability in only considering the players' incentives to change their strategies. It does not rely on any assumptions about the players' reactions to these incentives and it is thus independent of the law of motion (e.g., whether players move simultaneously or sequentially). This paper presents a general notion of static stability in symmetric N-player games and population games, of which evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and continuously stable strategy (CSS) are essentially special cases. Unlike them, the proposed stability concept does not depend on the existence of special structures in the game such as multilinear payoff functions or unidimensional strategy spaces
Schlagwörter: 
Static stability
evolutionarily stable strategy
continuously stable strategy
risk dominance
potential games
JEL: 
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
965.53 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.