Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202427
Authors: 
Benkert, Jean-Michel
Letina, Igor
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper 235
Abstract: 
This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where: (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant interim transfer is paid to agents in each period while the contest is ongoing, and (iii) a final prize is paid once the principal stops the contest, is optimal for the principal and implements the first-best.
Subjects: 
innovation
dynamic contests
research contests
inducement prizes
JEL: 
O32
D02
L19
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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