Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202359
Authors: 
Pittman, Russell
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
EAG Discussion Paper No. 07-9
Publisher: 
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG), Washington, DC
Abstract: 
In antitrust enforcement as in cost-benefit analysis, neoclassical economics may be interpreted as arguing for the use of a "total welfare" standard whose implementation treats transfers as welfare-neutral. Several recent papers call for antitrust agencies to move in the direction of this version of a total welfare standard for enforcement. However, as Williamson (1968) noted, horizontal mergers typically result in transfers that may greatly exceed in magnitude any deadweight loss or efficiency gain, so that a decision to ignore transfers may be quite important. I argue that such transfers are likely overall to be quite regressive, and thus that a consumer surplus standard rather than a total welfare standard may be appropriate for antitrust. Two common arguments against this standard – that most mergers are in markets for intermediate goods, and that a consumer welfare standard implies a tolerance for monopsony – are examined and found wanting. I argue in addition that, even if a total welfare standard is used, both the finance literature on merger outcomes and the structure of the U.S. enforcement agencies suggest that the use of a consumer surplus standard by the agencies is more likely to achieve that goal.
JEL: 
D02
D31
G34
K21
L40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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