Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202332 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 19-032
Verlag: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
Informal exchange of information among competitors has been well-documented in a variety of industries, and one's expectation of reciprocity shown to be a key determinant. We use an indeterminate horizon centipede game to establish a feedback loop in the laboratory and show that an individual's beliefs about the recipient's intentions to reciprocate matter more than a recipient's ability to do so. This implies that reducing strategic uncertainty about a competitor's behavior has a stronger effect on information ows than reducing environmental uncertainty (about the competitor's ability). We further show results on the formation of beliefs and discuss managerial implications.
Schlagwörter: 
knowledge diffusion
information sharing
reciprocity
conversation
experimental economics
centipede game
JEL: 
O33
D8
C72
C91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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Datei
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