Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202332
Authors: 
Ganglmair, Bernhard
Holcomb, Alex
Myung, Noah
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 19-032
Publisher: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Abstract: 
Informal exchange of information among competitors has been well-documented in a variety of industries, and one's expectation of reciprocity shown to be a key determinant. We use an indeterminate horizon centipede game to establish a feedback loop in the laboratory and show that an individual's beliefs about the recipient's intentions to reciprocate matter more than a recipient's ability to do so. This implies that reducing strategic uncertainty about a competitor's behavior has a stronger effect on information ows than reducing environmental uncertainty (about the competitor's ability). We further show results on the formation of beliefs and discuss managerial implications.
Subjects: 
knowledge diffusion
information sharing
reciprocity
conversation
experimental economics
centipede game
JEL: 
O33
D8
C72
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.