Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20222
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dc.contributor.authorIchino, Andreaen_US
dc.contributor.authorMuehlheusser, Gerden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:12:31Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:12:31Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20222-
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship maynot be optimal if the goal is to determine his loyalty to the match and if the cost of ending therelationship increases over time. The intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we learn lesson how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving to the partner thepossibility to misbehave he might be tempted to do it, and only in this case there is a chanceto learn his type at a time where separation would be possible at a relatively low cost.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x987en_US
dc.subject.jelM5en_US
dc.subject.jelD8en_US
dc.subject.jelD2en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmonitoringen_US
dc.subject.keywordprobationen_US
dc.subject.keywordefforten_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungskontrolleen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwKostenen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleHow Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agentsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn378140426en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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