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Autoren: 
Slemrod, Joel
Ur Rehman, Obeid
Waseem, Mazhar
Datum: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7731
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine two Pakistani programs to explore the role of deterrence as well as social and psychological factors in the tax compliance behavior of agents. In the first of these programs, the government began revealing income tax paid by every taxpayer in the country. The second program publicly recognizes and rewards the top 100 tax paying corporations, partnerships, self-employed individuals, and wage-earners. We find that both public disclosure and social recognition of top taxpayers caused a substantial increase in tax payments. We explore the drivers of this behavior, including the shift of social norms toward compliance.
Schlagwörter: 
tax evasion
income tax
social norms
JEL: 
H24
H25
H26
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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