Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201955 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7729
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper defines the concept of feedback Kant-Nash equilibrium for a discrete-time model of resource exploitation by infinitely-lived Kantian and Nashian players, where we define Kantian agents as those who act in accordance with the categorical imperative. We revisit a well-known dynamic model of the tragedy of the commons and ask what would happen if not all agents are solely motivated by self interest. We establish that even without external punishment of violation of social norms, if a sufficiently large fraction of the population consists of Kantian agents, the tragedy of the commons can be substantially mitigated.
Subjects: 
Kantian equilibrium
rule of behavior
categorical imperative
JEL: 
C71
D62
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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