Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201662 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
BGPE Discussion Paper No. 186
Verlag: 
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE), Nürnberg
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, we use an experimental setup to classify cooperation types using a sequential prisoner's dilemma and a one shot sequential public goods game. In these two games, we examine the within subject stability of cooperation preferences. Our results suggest that subjects classified as conditional cooperators in the prisoner's dilemma match others' contributions in the public goods game to a significantly larger degree compared to other types, which indicates a substantial consistency. Regarding discrete behavioral types, we find that the prisoner's dilemma performs well in identifying conditional cooperators while it is only an imperfect tool for identifying selfish types in the public goods game.
Schlagwörter: 
conditional cooperation
public goods game
sequential prisoner's dilemma
discrete behavioral types
JEL: 
C72
C91
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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