Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/201662
Authors: 
Eichenseer, Michael
Moser, Johannes
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
BGPE Discussion Paper 186
Abstract: 
In this paper, we use an experimental setup to classify cooperation types using a sequential prisoner's dilemma and a one shot sequential public goods game. In these two games, we examine the within subject stability of cooperation preferences. Our results suggest that subjects classified as conditional cooperators in the prisoner's dilemma match others' contributions in the public goods game to a significantly larger degree compared to other types, which indicates a substantial consistency. Regarding discrete behavioral types, we find that the prisoner's dilemma performs well in identifying conditional cooperators while it is only an imperfect tool for identifying selfish types in the public goods game.
Subjects: 
conditional cooperation
public goods game
sequential prisoner's dilemma
discrete behavioral types
JEL: 
C72
C91
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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