Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201647 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] DIW Weekly Report [ISSN:] 2568-7697 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 26/27 [Publisher:] Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) [Place:] Berlin [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 215-220
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
The desire to avoid the shame of being dependent on government aid is often cited as a cause of low welfare take-up rates. In contrast to other obstacles, such as transaction costs or a lack of information, little empirical research has been conducted on how stigma affects social benefits take-up. In this Weekly Report, a controlled laboratory experiment is presented whose results support the following hypothesis: potential recipients fear being perceived as low-skilled (ability stigma) or willing to live off others (free-rider stigma). Hence, they choose to forego a beneficial transfer if it must be claimed publicly. The results indicate that increasing the discreetness of the application and payout processes would help dismantle the stigma and thus increase the welfare take-up rate.
Schlagwörter: 
Stigma
Signaling
Non-take-up
Welfare program
JEL: 
C91
D03
H31
I38
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
246.84 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.