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Dianetti, Jodi
Ferrari, Giorgio
Fischer, Markus
Nendel, Max
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers No. 621
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
We study mean field games with scalar It-type dynamics and costs that are submodular with respect to a suitable order relation on the state and measure space. The submodularity assumption has a number of interesting consequences. Firstly, it allows us to prove existence of solutions via an application of Tarski's fixed point theorem, covering cases with discontinuous dependence on the measure variable. Secondly, it ensures that the set of solutions enjoys a lattice structure: in particular, there exist a minimal and a maximal solution. Thirdly, it guarantees that those two solutions can be obtained through a simple learning procedure based on the iterations of the best-response-map. The mean field game is first defined over ordinary stochastic controls, then extended to relaxed controls. Our approach allows also to treat a class of submodular mean field games with common noise in which the representative player at equilibrium interacts with the (conditional) mean of its state's distribution.
Mean field games
submodular cost function
complete lattice
first order stochastic dominance
Tarski's fixed point theorem
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Working Paper

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