Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20126
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dc.contributor.authorIrlenbusch, Bernden_US
dc.contributor.authorSliwka, Dirken_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:11:48Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:11:48Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20126-
dc.description.abstractThe impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals? payoffs are determined by a random component. It is shown that direct reciprocal behavior is much stronger in a more transparent situation where efforts are revealed to the principals. However, there is nosignificant impact of transparency on average effort as non-transparency leads to a stronger diversity in behavioral patterns such that at the same time the frequency of very low and very large effort levels increases.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x887en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordtransparencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordreputationen_US
dc.subject.keywordgift exchangeen_US
dc.subject.keywordinequity aversionen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwExperimenten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleTransparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relationsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn371985439en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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