Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20126 
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dc.contributor.authorIrlenbusch, Bernden
dc.contributor.authorSliwka, Dirken
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:11:48Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:11:48Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20126-
dc.description.abstractThe impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals? payoffs are determined by a random component. It is shown that direct reciprocal behavior is much stronger in a more transparent situation where efforts are revealed to the principals. However, there is nosignificant impact of transparency on average effort as non-transparency leads to a stronger diversity in behavioral patterns such that at the same time the frequency of very low and very large effort levels increases.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x887en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtransparencyen
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen
dc.subject.keywordreputationen
dc.subject.keywordgift exchangeen
dc.subject.keywordinequity aversionen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsvertragen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwExperimenten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleTransparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn371985439en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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