Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20120 
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dc.contributor.authorKoeniger, Winfrieden
dc.contributor.authorVindigni, Andreaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:11:45Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:11:45Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20120-
dc.description.abstractProduct market regulation and employment protection are highly correlated across OECD countries. Using an augmented model of monopolistic competition we show why in countries with more regulated product markets, incumbent workers prefer to protect jobs relatively more. Product market regulation increases the scope for employment protection because firms can bear the cost of employment protection more easily and still break even. Moreover, product market regulation decreases employment so that the workers' outside optionbecomes relatively worse. This increases the incentive to protect the job.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x880en
dc.subject.jelL16en
dc.subject.jelJ65en
dc.subject.jelJ63en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcollective dismissal costen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen
dc.subject.stwKündigungsschutzen
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen
dc.subject.stwMonopolistischer Wettbewerben
dc.subject.stwKündigungen
dc.subject.stwKostenen
dc.subject.stwInsider-Outsider-Modellen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleEmployment Protection and Product Market Regulation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn371982480en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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