Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20087
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dc.contributor.authorSliwka, Dirken_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:11:30Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:11:30Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20087-
dc.description.abstractBy enriching a principal-agent model it is shown that the introduction of monetary incentives may reduce an agent?s motivation. In a first step, we allow for the possibility that some agents stick to unverifiable agreements. The larger the fraction of reliable agents, the lower powered will then be the optimal incentive scheme and fixed wages become optimal when performance measurement is costly. If social norms matter such that some agents? reliabilityis influenced by their beliefs on the convictions of others, high powered incentives signal that not sticking to agreements is a widespread behavior and may lead to lower effort levels.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x844en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordintrinsic motivationen_US
dc.subject.keywordmotivation crowding-outen_US
dc.subject.keywordhonestyen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOn the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn368837440en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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