Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20087 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSliwka, Dirken
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:11:30Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:11:30Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20087-
dc.description.abstractBy enriching a principal-agent model it is shown that the introduction of monetary incentives may reduce an agent?s motivation. In a first step, we allow for the possibility that some agents stick to unverifiable agreements. The larger the fraction of reliable agents, the lower powered will then be the optimal incentive scheme and fixed wages become optimal when performance measurement is costly. If social norms matter such that some agents? reliabilityis influenced by their beliefs on the convictions of others, high powered incentives signal that not sticking to agreements is a widespread behavior and may lead to lower effort levels.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x844en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.jelD23en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen
dc.subject.keywordintrinsic motivationen
dc.subject.keywordmotivation crowding-outen
dc.subject.keywordhonestyen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOn the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn368837440en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
561.66 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.