Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/200790 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] KDI Journal of Economic Policy [ISSN:] 2586-4130 [Volume:] 38 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Korea Development Institute (KDI) [Place:] Sejong [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 87-101
Publisher: 
Korea Development Institute (KDI), Sejong
Abstract: 
A person's life consists of two important stages: the first stage as a student and the second stage as a worker. In an integrated model of education and career concerns, I analyze the welfare effects of education. In Spence's job market signaling model, education as a sorting device improves efficiency by mitigating the lemon market problem. In contrast, in the integrated model, education as a sorting device can be detrimental to social welfare, as it eliminates work incentives generated by career concerns.
Subjects: 
education
signaling
career concerns
JEL: 
D86
G38
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-sa Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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