Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/200694 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 38-2018
Publisher: 
Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics, Marburg
Abstract: 
In this paper, we set up a theoretical model to study how unilateral policies aimed at improving transparency for consumers concerning the source of certain raw materials influence prices, illegal mining activities and welfare. The model distinguishes two regions in the world, North and South. Firms in the North import natural resources from the South to produce final consumption goods. In one of the countries, in the South, local groups attempt to access natural resources, which results in rent seeking conflicts with the government and illegal mining. We find that a unilateral embargo against the conflict country as well as certification of legal mines can reduce rent seeking and illegal mining with different welfare consequences in the countries involved.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.