Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/200645 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) No. 633
Publisher: 
Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Hannover
Abstract: 
With a series of public goods games in a 2x2-design, we analyze two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. Cooperation increases when non-contributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance. However, cooperation is only durable when free-riders are "shamed" by disclosing their misdemeanor. We find shaming effects to be strong enough to make appeals to morality redundant for participants' decisions.
Subjects: 
Shaming
framing
tax avoidance
public goods experiment
JEL: 
E62
H26
H30
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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