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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2019-14
Verlag: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Atlanta, GA
Zusammenfassung: 
Using variations in unemployment insurance policies over time and across U.S. states, this paper provides evidence that allowing unemployed workers to delay the collection of benefits increases their job-finding rate. In a model with discrete job take-up decisions, benefit entitlement, wage-indexed benefits, and heterogeneous job types, I demonstrate that the policy can increase an unemployed worker's willingness to work, even though more benefits in general reduce the relative value of employment. In a calibrated quantitative model, I find that allowing delayed benefit collection increases the overall job finding rates and may lower the unemployment rate both in a steady state stationary economy and over a transition path during 2008−12.
Schlagwörter: 
unemployment insurance
social program design
Great Recession
JEL: 
E24
J65
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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