Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/200548
Authors: 
Mandelman, Federico S.
Waddle, Andrea
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2019-10
Abstract: 
The emergence of global value chains not only leads to a magnification of trade in intermediate inputs but also to an extensive technology diffusion among the different production units involved in arms-length relationships. In this context, the lack of enforcement of intellectual property rights has recently become a highly controversial subject of debate in the context of the China-U.S. trade negotiations. This paper analyzes the strategic interaction of tariff policies and the enforcement of intellectual property rights within a quantitative general equilibrium framework. Results indicate that, in principle, tariffs could be an effective deterrent for weak protections for intellectual property. Moreover, weakening enforcement may be a strong deterrent for raising tariffs. These results combined indicate that there is scope for international cooperation on these fronts.
Subjects: 
tariffs
intellectual property rights
technology capital transfers
international trade
JEL: 
F41
F42
F51
F21
F13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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