Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/200434 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2019-02
Publisher: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Abstract: 
Norms and nudges are both popular types of interventions. Recent years have seen the rise of "norm-nudges" - nudges whose mechanism of action relies on social norms, eliciting or changing social expectations. Norm-nudges can be powerful interventions, but they can easily fail to be effective and can even backfire unless they are designed with care. We highlight important considerations when designing norm-nudges and discuss a general model of social behavior based on expectations and conditional preferences. We present the results of several experiments where norm-nudging can backfire, and ways to avoid these negative outcomes.
Subjects: 
Norm-Nudges
Nudge
Social Information
Social Norms
JEL: 
B41
D01
D9
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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