Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/200433 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2019-01
Publisher: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Abstract: 
We study escalation and aggression in an experimental first-strike game in which two participants play multiple rounds of a money-earning task. In each round, both players can spend money to accumulate weapons. The player with more weapons can spend money to strike against the other player, which almost totally eliminates the victim's earnings potential and removes their capacity to strike. Weapons can serve as a means of deterrence. In four treatments, we find that deterrence is strengthened if weapon stocking cannot be observed, that a balance of power is effective in maintaining peace, and that mutually beneficial trade decreases the risk of confrontation, but not necessarily the likelihood of costly arms races.
Subjects: 
Mutually assured destruction
balance of power
arms races
deterrence
trade
laboratory experiment
JEL: 
C72
C91
F51
N40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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