Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/200427 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2018-08
Publisher: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Abstract: 
This paper develops a dynamic model of legislative policy making with evolving, privately observed policy preferences. Our goal is to find conditions under which decision rules, which assign feasible policies based on the legislators' preferences, are sustainable in the long run. We show that under some mild conditions, every decision rule that would be implementable with monetary transfers can be approximately sustained in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the dynamic model. In this equilibrium, the legislators receive payoffs arbitrarily close to those they would obtain if they could commit ex ante to truthfully apply the decision rule in every period. An application of our result yields a dynamic issue-by-issue median voter theorem in the vein of Baron's (1996) for a spatial framework with incomplete information.
Subjects: 
Committee voting
Information
Legislative bargaining
Sustainability
JEL: 
D71
D72
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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