Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/200418 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2017-15
Verlag: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Zusammenfassung: 
Previous studies have shown that individuals are less likely to help a person in need when there are "bystanders" present who can also offer help. We designed an experiment to re-examine this "bystander effect" using modified dictator games. We find lower giving rates in the presence of bystanders, confirming the existence of a bystander effect. However, we also show that the recipient's welfare is greater when bystanders are present, challenging the usual interpretation that the bystander effect is due to an erosion of prosocial values.
Schlagwörter: 
bystander effect
bystander dilemma
diffusion of responsibility
dictator game
socialnorms
JEL: 
C92
D64
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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