Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/200296 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFS Working Papers No. W18/07
Verlag: 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), London
Zusammenfassung: 
Tax authorities worldwide are implementing voluntary disclosure schemes to recover tax on offshore investments. Such schemes are typically designed retrospectively following the bulk acquisition of information on offshore holdings, such as the recent "Paradise" and "Panama" papers. They offer an opportunity for affected taxpayers to make a voluntary disclosure, with reduced fine rates for truthful disclosure. We characterize the taxpayer/tax authority game with and without a scheme and show that a scheme increases net expected tax revenue, decreases illegal offshore investment, increases onshore investment, and could either increase or decrease total offshore investment (legal plus illegal).
Schlagwörter: 
voluntary disclosure
offshore tax evasion
tax amnesty
third-party information
JEL: 
H26
D85
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.03 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.