Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20025
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dc.contributor.authorJoosten, Reinouden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:10:33Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:10:33Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20025-
dc.description.abstractTwo agents possess the fishing rights to a lake. Each period they have two options, to catch without restraint, e.g., to use a fine-mazed net, or to catch with some restraint, e.g., to use a wide-mazed net. The use of a fine-mazed net always yields a higher immediate catch than the alternative. The present catches depend on the behavior of the agents in the past. The more often the agents have used the fine-mazed net in the past, the lower the present catches are independent from the type of nets being used. We determine feasible rewards and provide (subgame perfect) equilibria for the limiting average reward criterion using methods inspired by the repeated-games literature. Our analysis shows that a 'tragedy of the commons' can be averted, as sustainable Pareto-efficient outcomes can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPapers on economics & evolution |x0506en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelQ22en_US
dc.subject.jelQ20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordgames with frequency-dependent stage payoffsen_US
dc.subject.keywordlimiting average rewarden_US
dc.subject.keywordequilibriaen_US
dc.subject.keywordrenewable common-pool resourcesen_US
dc.subject.stwAllmenderessourceen_US
dc.subject.stwErneuerbare Ressourcenen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleA small Fish War: an example with frequency-dependent stage payoffsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn495265225en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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