Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20025
Authors: 
Joosten, Reinoud
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Papers on economics & evolution 0506
Abstract: 
Two agents possess the fishing rights to a lake. Each period they have two options, to catch without restraint, e.g., to use a fine-mazed net, or to catch with some restraint, e.g., to use a wide-mazed net. The use of a fine-mazed net always yields a higher immediate catch than the alternative. The present catches depend on the behavior of the agents in the past. The more often the agents have used the fine-mazed net in the past, the lower the present catches are independent from the type of nets being used. We determine feasible rewards and provide (subgame perfect) equilibria for the limiting average reward criterion using methods inspired by the repeated-games literature. Our analysis shows that a 'tragedy of the commons' can be averted, as sustainable Pareto-efficient outcomes can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria.
Subjects: 
games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs
limiting average reward
equilibria
renewable common-pool resources
JEL: 
C73
C72
Q22
Q20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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