Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/200184
Authors: 
Palermo Kuss, Ana Helena
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 01-2019
Abstract: 
Inspired by Fröhlich and Oppenheimer (1990), an experimental survey in the lab was designed to find out if preferences for three different redistribution schemes differ under a veil of ignorance. The three schemes are a stylized version of the status quo German welfare state (A), a control scheme without income taxation and redistribution (B) and one in which a flat tax-financed basic income is paid to all (C). Furthermore, the study investigates whether the introduction of a basic income induces a decrease in the time allocation to paid and unpaid work. The results point to no significant difference in allocated working hours between A and C. Concerning preferences, access to information on implications of schemes and self-interest played a central role in their definition.
Subjects: 
lab experiment
basic income
welfare state
Germany
time allocation
constitutional economics
labor supply
JEL: 
C91
I38
J22
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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