Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/200151 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 317
Publisher: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Abstract: 
We study zero-rating, a practice whereby an Internet service provider (ISP) that limits retail data consumption exempts certain content from that limit. This practice is particularly controversial when an ISP zero-rates its own vertically integrated content, because the data limit and ensuing overage charges impose an additional cost on rival content. We find that zero-rating and vertical integration are complementary in improving social welfare, though potentially at the expense of lower profit to an unaffiliated content provider. Moreover, allowing content providers to pay for zero-rating via a sponsored data plan raises welfare by inducing the ISP to zero-rate more content.
Subjects: 
Data Caps
Sponsored Data
Two-Sided Market
Vertical Content Foreclosure
Zero-Rating
JEL: 
D43
L11
L42
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-316-2
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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